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ANTITRUST POLICY AND THE
CONGLOMERATE FIRM: "A ROSE
IS A ROSE IS A ROSE"
THOMAS F. SHEA*
Only a year ago, the mere mention of the word "conglomerate" was
likely to cause the blood of investors and securities analysts to race wildly
while visions of quick profits and high price/earnings ratios danced in their
heads. More recently, however, the appellation appears to be less frequently
employed. Executives seem to prefer the term "multi-market" to describe
a business enterprise engaged in a range of disparate activities.' Although
there may be no real difference in meaning between the two terms, 2 the fact
is indisputable that the conglomerate form of business organization has
rather recently come under close judicial and governmental scrutiny in the
light cast by the antitrust laws.8
The guiding principle behind antitrust policy in the United States is
that competition is the key to a successful economic system and the anti-
trust laws are the tools by which competition is to be kept viable and ef-
fective.4 It is based on the belief that freely acting competitive forces will
afford us the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the greatest economic
progress. 5 A corollary proposition is that the lack of competition, such as
occurs in a monopoly, is dangerous. The framers of the antitrust laws ap-
pear to have been in agreement with the Actonian monition: "Power tends
to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely."
One of the most effective ways in which a business enterprise can in-
crease its economic power is by the direct acquisition of another company.
Although section 1 of the Sherman Act,7 which forbids all contracts in re-
straint of trade, can undoubtedly reach contracts to merge,8 the primary
weapon in the antitrust arsenal directed against anticompetitive mergers
and acquisitions is section 7 of the Clayton Act.9
*Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University, School of Law. B.A.,
Cathedral College, 1957; LL.B., St. John's University, 1960; LL.M., New York University,
1968. Office of General Council, Kraftco Corporation.
1 See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, April 10, 1969, at 1, col. 4.
2 "That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet." W. SHAKE-
SPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET, act II, scene ii, line 42.
S The name "trust" was early ascribed to all giant business enterprises and stuck even
after they had abandoned the trust device whereby stockholders surrendered voting power
to managing "trustees," 1 S. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLIcIES 4 (1958).
4 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
5Id. at 4.
6 Letter from John Emerich Edward Dalberg-Acton, Lord Acton, to Bishop Mandell
Creighton, April 5, 1887, in J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 750 (14th ed. 1968).
7 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), formerly 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
8 See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); North-
ern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
9 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
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Section 7 provides, in essence, that it is unlawful for one corporation
to acquire stock or assets of another "where in any line of commerce in any
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly."' 0 Since its enactment
it has been clear that section 7 is applicable to horizontal mergers, that is,
the acquisition of one competitor by another." A hypothetical example of
a horizontal merger would be the acquisition of Ford by General Motors.
Further, one need not possess a graduate degree in economics to be able
to conclude that such a transaction, if consummated, might substantially
lessen competition in the American automobile industry.
It is now equally well settled that section 7, particularly as amended
in 1950,12 reaches vertical mergers, i.e., the acquisition of a supplier by his
customer, or vice versa.'3 By way of illustration, if a television manufacturer
acquired the only company producing a rare earth phosphor needed in
color television tubes, his competitors might well be foreclosed from an
essential source of supply and go out of business.
14
Having roughly defined horizontal and vertical mergers, a definition
for conglomerate mergers can readily be devised: they are something else.15
In other words, mergers which are neither horizontal nor vertical may
loosely be referred to as "conglomerate."
An example of a pure conglomerate merger would be the acquisition
of a baby food packer by a locomotive manufacturer. The lack of any dis.
cernible relationship between the two organizations makes it apparent that
traditional antitrust concepts are of little value in weighing the effects of
conglomerate acquisitions. This is not surprising because "traditional" con-
notes "old" and the conglomerate merger trend is a comparatively recent
phenomenon. Perhaps as a result of heightened enforcement activity di-
rected against horizontal and vertical acquisitions, conglomerate mergers
increased from 38.1 percent of all mergers from 1948 to 1951, to 91 percent
of all mergers in 1968.16
Lo Id.
11 See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 617 (1957)
(dissenting opinion).
12 64 Stat. 1125 (1950). The 1950 amendment took asset acquisitions, as well as stock
acquisitions, into the coverage of section 7 and eliminated the requirement that adverse
effects were to be measured only against the competition between the acquiring and
acquired firms. An'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRusT RE'. 117 (1955).
18 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
14 "The primary vice of a vertical merger ... is that, by foreclosing the competitors
of either party from a segment of the market otherwise open to them, the arrangement
may act as a 'dog on competition'...." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
323-24 (1962).
15 This is not to be considered a lapse into current idiom. It is generally agreed that
"[a] 'conglomerate merger' is most simply defined as one that is not horizontal or ver-
tical...." ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, at 83
(1968).
16 Address by Att'y Gen. Mitchell to Georgia Bar Ass'n, June 6, 1969, in 5 TRADE RaE.
REP. 50,247 (1969).
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Of course, taxonomists are as active in the field of conglomerate mergers
as they are elsewhere, and so sub-classes have been discerned. In addition
to the pure conglomerate merger there is the "product extension" merger,
the acquisition of a firm selling different but related or complementary
products; and the "market extension" merger, which involves the acquisi-
tion of a firm selling the same product but in a different geographical
area.
17
Although traditional antitrust criteria are not ordinarily applicable to
conglomerates, new approaches have been devised to test whether or not a
conglomerate acquisition threatens competition. Such factors as potential
reciprocity,18 increased economic concentration 19 and effect on potential
competition,2 alone or in combination, have been considered by the courts
and agencies in arriving at the conclusion that a given conglomerate acqui-
sition might substantially lessen competition.
Reciprocity is the practice by which a firm purchases from a company
to which it also sells products of its own. The vice of reciprocity is that it
injects "an irrelevant and alien factor" 21 into the choice of supplier. When
a company which previously did not sell to one of its suppliers acquires a
firm which manufactures goods needed by that supplier, the potential for
reciprocity is created; "I'll continue to buy from you only if you buy from
me."
A trend toward economic concentration exists when fewer, bigger firms
emerge to control production in an industry. Economic concentration can
be hardened through the acquisition of an already dominant firm by an
even larger company engaged in different but related activities whose
greater resources can supply competitive advantages.
22
Potential competition is the threat posed by firms not yet in the market
to enter if conditions become sufficiently attractive. If firms already in a
given market are enjoying extremely high profit margins, they may soon
have company. Knowing this, it is theorized, the existing competitors will
be willing to pass on greater savings to their customers because their greed
is tempered by prudence. If a potential competitor enters the market
through the conglomerate acquisition of a company already there, the num-
ber of competing firms in the market is not increased (the acquiring firm
is simply substituted for the acquired firm) and the regulating pressure of
the acquiring firm's potential competition is removed. This was one of the
results decried in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.2 3
Cases using the foregoing tools for analysis of conglomerate mergers
are increasing in frequency as the Justice Department aggressively files new
17 ABA SECrbON OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUsT DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968, at 83 (1968).
18 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 US. 592 (1965).
19 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 US. 568 (1967).
2od.; United States v. Standard Oil Co., 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966).
21 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965).
22 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
28 Id. at 575.
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actions probing the outer limits of section 7. The Department has recently
challenged the acquisition of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation by a well-
known conglomerate, Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.;24 sought the divestiture of
Canteen Corporation, a food and vending service company, by International
Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT);2 5 attacked the proposed
take-over of B. F. Goodrich Company by another conglomerate, Northwest
Industries, Inc.;26 and, unsuccessfully, sought to preliminarily enjoin the
unlikely-seeming merger of ITT and Hartford Fire Insurance Company.27
Of course, since no merger is per se unlawful,28 the mere presence of
concentration, potential reciprocity, or loss of potential competition is not,
per se, equivalent to a finding that a conglomerate acquisition is to be
condemned. It must first be determined that these or other factors, in the
particular circumstances involved, may substantially lessen competition
within the meaning of section 7. It is at this point that economic analysis
becomes important. After all, entrance into a market by merger as well as
by internal expansion can bestow benefits upon the economy. It may shake
up a lethargic, oligopolistic industry and inject the element of brisk com-
petition. The management know-how of a conglomerate company may pro-
vide its newly acquired subsidiary with just the efficiency it needs to become
a viable competitor. Economies of scale in research and selling and the action
of synergism, by which the whole becomes greater than the sum of its parts,
may aid both the acquired and acquiring companies. The loss of a potential
competitor may be more than compensated for by the new strength of a
previously marginal operator.
In short, the mere incantation of "reciprocity," "concentration" and
"potential competition" is not sufficient to prove an anticompetitive result.
As stated by President Nixon's Task Force on Productivity and Compe-
tition:
If one interprets "elimination of potential competition," "reciprodty," and
"foreclosure" as threats to competition, one can always bring and usually
win a case against the merger of two large companies, however diverse
their activities may be.29
24 United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-458, 5 TRADE REG. REP.
45,069, at 52,712 (W.D. Pa., April 14, 1969).
25 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., Civil No. 69 C 924 (N.D.III., April
28, 1969).
26 United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
27 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
28 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). "Statistics reflecting the
shares of the market controlled by the industry leaders and the parties to the merger are,
of course, the primary index of market power; but only a further examination of the
particular market- its structure, history and probable future-can provide the appro-
priate setting for judging the probable anticompetitive effects of the merger." Id. at 522
n.38.
29 1969 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITION, 115
CONG. REc. 6472, 6476 (daily ed. June 16, 1969) [STIGLER TASK FORCE REPORT].
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If the issues before the deciding courts are economic as well as legal,
then the courts should receive the expert testimony of qualified economists.
However, it is at least possible that such testimony will be conflicting. If
one group of economists can assert that increasing national debt is essential
for a sound economy while another group believes debt to be as dangerous
for governments as it is for individuals, it is not surprising that differences
of opinion may exist as to the anticompetitive effect of conglomerate
acquisitions.30
It is the purpose of this section to examine the antitrust laws as they
speak with regard to the conglomerate phenomenon in the hope that, at
least, the battle lines will become more clearly drawn.
30 "We are in the midst of a great debate on conglomerate mergers. While some have
warned that the current merger movement poses grave dangers to the structure and vi-
tality of competitive markets, others have defended conglomerate activity as a method of
increasing the efficiency and dynamism of corporate enterprise, thereby adding to com-
petitive vigor." Address by FTC Commissioner Elman, American Bar Ass'n National
Institute, October 23, 1969.
